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Dear Rector,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
PROLOGUE: LAW , POWER AND M ORALITY: WHO WINS ?
Should Thucydides be read in the light of the Sophists or is he better understood as a
predecessor of Aristotle? Although his account of the Peloponnesian War was written almost
two and a half millennia ago, the question still bothers the minds of students of International
Relations. The usual interpretation of this Greek author as founder of the Realist School
bases itself particularly on the Melian Dialogue.1 Crucial in that exchange of views between
the militarily strong Athenians and the weak inhabitants of the island of Melos is a still often
quoted admonition by the former to the latter:
‘not to imagine that you will influence us by saying … that you have never done us any harm …since you
know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice
depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do
and the weak accept what they have to accept (“δυνατα δε οι προυχοντες πρασσουσι και οι ασϑενεις
ξυγχωρουσιν”)’.2

The Melians, however, do not accept, trusting in the justice of their cause and hoping for the
help of the Gods and the Spartans. Subsequently, the whole story ends with the conquest of
Melos by the Athenians, the killing of all male inhabitants of military age and the selling of
all women and children into slavery. Justice, the message seems to be, is not for international
politics. What counts is ‘the law of the stronger’.
In a recent article Nancy Kokaz argues that Thucydides does criticize Sophistic dichotomies
of power and justice, human nature and convention, domestic and international politics.3 Her
point is that throughout the Melian dialogue ‘there is never a doubt that the Athenian action
violates rules of “fair play and just dealing”.’4 The Melians use the wrong arguments,
referring as they do to their own self constraint in regard to the Athenians and to Athenian
self-interest – if you conquer and destroy us, the Spartans will come and do the same unto
you – while hoping for outside help. They do not, however, appeal to justice. In fact, the
Athenians do have a normative view on power: ‘to stand up to one’s equals, to behave with
deference towards one’s superiors, and to treat one’s inferiors with moderation’. This maxim
is called ‘safe rule’ rather than ‘just rule’, probably, Kokaz feels, because in the Athenian
mind there could be no conflict between genuine considerations of safety and justice. The
condition of humanity5 is not that power automatically amounts to domination: it ‘offers both
constructive and destructive possibilities depending on its use’.6 The Athenians only maintain
that the standard of justice varies with the power of those concerned. What Thucydides hates,
like Aristotle after him, is mere ‘cleverness’ as expressed in the Melian arguments. Practical
wisdom goes deeper; it requires moderation and justice. Thucydides, Kokaz argues, ‘offers us
an invitation to move beyond the Sophists and rediscover our human potential for political
excellence.’ 7
Here we are, at the beginning of the third millennium, and still discussing Thucydidean
perspectives on moderating power. But should that surprise us? Has humankind in the ages
since Thudydides found conclusive answers in the triangle of law, power and morality?
Should human rights perhaps be seen as a way out of these dialectics, some sort of synthesis
in the form of a decisive instrument to moderate power by binding its use to internationally
accepted legal standards? Is this humankind’s definitive response to the moral history of
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inhumanity as exemplified by the killing of the Melian men and all those terrible violations
of human dignity through the ages?8 No – I wish to argue today – it is a beginning, marked
by strong ideals and convictions but also by constraints and setbacks. To try and protect
human dignity by law implies toil and trouble: laborious law, in other words.
Human rights and the dialectics of law and power
The tendency to abuse power is as old as human history. Therefore the use of power should
always be tied to certain norms. Where such norms express legal protection of the fundamental
freedoms and basic entitlements of each and every human being, we speak of ‘human rights’.
Since here human dignity itself is at stake, claims based on these rights should normally trump
other types of claims, both private and public.
Notably, however, the global endeavour for the realization of human rights suffers from a huge
deficit that is all too often submerged in the general euphoria of human rights declarations,
conferences, committee meetings and workshops. Watch, for example, the still so difficult
struggle against impunity of state-related perpetrators of violations of civil and political
rights; look at the apparent lack of protection offered to minorities; consider the continued
barrier of the public -private divide and its paralysing effects on the struggle against domestic
violence; note the non-fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) in a world in
which so many people’s basic needs remain denied. That fundamental weakness in human
rights concerns their relation to social reality: declared rights, all too often, at the beginning
of what are bound to be long and enduring struggles for implementation rather than acquired
rights in the sense of formal legal protection of freedoms and titles that had already acquired
societal recognition as sources of entitlements.
The purpose of rights, as interests protected by law (Von Jhering), is to put conflicts of
interests in a normative setting and thus to prevent their manifestation as pure power
struggles. But although rights are abstract acknowledgements of claims in the sense of a
general commitment to offer legal protection for their realization, the world is full of denials
of claims founded upon people’s fundamental freedoms and basic entitlements. Actually,
while the whole idea of rights is based upon the expectation that evident violations would
lead to contentious action resulting in redress, human rights often remain without effective
remedies. This is due to two crucial deficiencies: firstly, the often prevailing inadequacy of
law as a check on power, and secondly, the lack of reception of these rights in many cultural
and politico-economic contexts.
In terms of the role and rule of law, society is expected to function in such a way that rights
are respected, and claims based on entitlements connected to those rights get honoured.
Dispute settlement is confined to cases in which there are conflicting claims protected by
different rights (between landlord and tenant, for example). In the case of human rights,
however, adequate embodiment in positive law is all too often lacking, while they get
violated in and from centres of power, too. There are notable differences in context here.
While in the Netherlands, for example, freedom of speech is protected by a historically
acquired right, in China it is based on an internationally declared right that is structurally
violated from the national political centre. In the case of economic, social and cultural rights
general recognition at the centres of power in the global economy is even lacking.
The character of human rights as ‘declaratory’ rather than ‘conclusive’ concerns economic,
social and cultural rights in particular and manifests itself especially in countries in the South.
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This is not just a matter of socioeconomic context: no jobs, no access to land and hence
extreme pressure on scarce productive resources that breeds frustration and aggression rather
than recognition of other people’s freedoms and needs. There is also a political setting that
finds its background in the history of colonialism and its effects on the distribution and
control of power, both internationally and in local contexts. As a result the fight for social
justice in a modern economy and polity has a long way to go. Internationally that struggle has
not yielded impressive fruits up till now. Over the past two centuries the gaps between the
richest and the poorest countries have widened while in absolute terms in the poorest region,
sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people living on less than one US dollar a day increased
considerably during the nineteen nineties.9 As a result of decisions taken in the name of
economic progress, the world’s poor often face increasing hardships from day to day. 10 In
that dim light the toughness of the struggle for social justice within so many developing
countries could hardly be seen as surprising.
Obviously, the human rights venture as envisaged requires laborious law based on
functioning legal systems, internationally as well as in domestic settings. To see what that
means let us now first go a little deeper into the meaning of law.
B ETWEEN SYSTEM AND LIFEWORLD: THE ROLE OF THE REGULAE IURIS
The essence of law, as we have seen, is that it binds power to certain norms, implying at the
least normative processes of settling disputes. This is a mission of a highly noble character as
exemplified in the inscription shown in the reading room of the Harvard Law School’s
library: OF LAW NO LESSE CAN BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAN THA T HER SEAT IS THE BOSOM OF
GOD.11 The reference to the Upright One implies an allegiance to justice. Legal norms then
are meant not only to regulate in the sense of securing order but also to reflect what is
generally seen as right and hence ought to be enforced. Law, in other words, binds power to a
morality that is seen as essential to the integrity of the community as such. 12
This rather idealistic view depicts law as it is meant to be: justice incognito. At the other
extreme we find anti-law: the use of legal instruments to institutionalize injustice.13 Karl
Marx saw law as rooted in class relations: ‘right can never be higher than the economic
structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby’. Socioeconomic power,
in that view, completely dominates law. Or, in the words of a 16th century English song:
‘Law grinds the poor and rich men make the law’.14
Reality tends to lie somewhere between, on the one hand, the binding of power to norms
rooted in morality and, on the other hand, the reflection of existing power relations in the
setting and execution of such standards. These dialectics of law and power are appealingly
echoed in the way in which the notorious villain Bul Super – a comic figure in Marten
Toonder’s Adventures of Tom Poes – expresses his view on law: ‘right is something crooked
that has been twisted’.
The issue then, is law’s moral foundations and connections. Obviously, human rights are
rooted in justice, first and foremost. Yet, the global venture for the protection of human
dignity is shaped in modern universalistic law, with bureaucratic mechanisms of standardsetting, monitoring and procedures to enforce compliance. Consequently, the whole project
has certain traits of a functional system, and it is precisely in its fundamental link to morality
that the human rights system needs constant renurturing from a lifeworld perspective.
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I am expressing myself now in terms of Jürgen Habermas’ distinction between ‘system’
and ‘lifeworld’.15 For Habermas, the impersonal relationships that typify an exchange
economy as well as a modern polity, imply that both tend to function as systems,
separated from the lifeworld of culture, social interaction and personality. A topical
illustration of what this refers to is the organization of agriculture in the European Union
and its alienation from the lifeworld of animals and people. Law, then, secures the
independence of economy and state from lifeworld structures. It regulates exchange
relations through property and contract and institutionalizes the political system by
defining bureaucratic positions based on administrative law. Modern law is not grounded
in normative rightness but is: positive in the sense of the outcome of established
processes of law-making; legalistic, implying an orientation towards rules; and formal,
meaning that cases are judged under what has been regulated with a view to ‘equal’
treatment of ‘equal’ cases.
Yet, it is precisely in the lifeworld that morality (and immorality for that matter) finds its
roots.16 Modern law then is functional coercion and as such in need of normative
justification. This confronts us with the crucial notion of legitimacy. While Weber saw law’s
claim to legitimacy as based purely on political domination, for Habermas enacted law
cannot secure the basis of its legitimacy simply through legality. 17 Indeed, with its many
manifestations of illegitimate rule the twentieth century has generally confronted humankind
with the complexity of legitimacy as a concept transcending formal-procedural legality.
Grounded in people’s convic tion that the way power is exercised over them and the way in
which they are being ruled are right, legitimacy transforms power into authority. In this light
legitimacy becomes not so much a fact but a process. The right procedures (due process) are
only one aspect of this; other elements concern the right principles and institutions and an
outcome acceptable to those affected by the exercise of power.18 In terms of legitimacy the
continuous challenge is, in other words, to find law in its ‘lifeworld’ connection to justice.19
Notably, that need to transcend purely formal legality is nothing new. Through the ages
substantial legitimization has been enhanced by applying the old principles of law-finding:
the regulae iuris. They throw light upon concrete cases in which legal rules first have to be
determined as applicable and then applied in line with a correct interpretation. As maxims
(maximae propositiones) the rules of law rest on everyday common sense; as concise
declarations of the demands of justice (generalia iuris principia) they are rooted in morality.
An example of legal common sense is the rule that everything that has come into being
through certain causes, can be dissolved by the same causes.20 General principles of justice
may be illustrated by the rule that without guilt there can be no punishment.21 Often the
regulae combine elements of both logic and fairness, exemplified, for example by the rule
that whosoever carries the burden should also be entitled to the benefits.22 Usually their form
is short and succinct while their authority rests on past experience in law-finding. In the
difficult task of weighing the different interests involved, the regulae assist those charged
with law-making as well as those responsible for law-finding in concrete cases.
These rules of law then, exert an immediate appeal to both heart and mind. Thus, Baldus
stated that a party in a court case that can invoke a regula iuris might be considered as being
prima facie in its right.23 While apparently that could be said in the fourteenth century, the
regulae have maintained their validity through the ages. For example, the stipulation that no
one can change his policy to another person’s unfair detriment24, acquired a modern
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translation in the principle of good government which demands that justified expectations as
have been raised, cannot be neglected. Paul Scholten has typified such general principles of
law as the desk light that may shine so clearly upon a case that what the ceiling light of the
statute books could not reveal, suddenly becomes clearly visible.25
Some regulae are quite precise, particularly those that pertain to due process. As examples
may serve the well-known rule that not just one party but both parties should be heard (audi
et alteram partem), and the rule that no one can be a judge in his own case (nemo iudex in
sua propria causa). Other regulae are of a highly general character, e.g. the exclamation that
freedom is of inestimable value (libertas inaestimabilis res est).26 A little more concrete, but
still common to many topics is the requirement of good faith (bona fides). Beside such rules
there are also those which are particular to one topic, e.g. sale can break no rent.
As ‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ the regulae iuris have been
acknowledged as a source of law-finding for the International Court of Justice (art. 38(1)(c)
of the ICJ Statute). But apart from their role as guidelines in adjudication they also play their
part in law-making and administration. While most rules originate in Roman law, many have
been incorporated in the Corpus Iuris Canonicis and in subsequent law books as well. Yet,
legal incorporation in recognized texts such as Dinus’ treatise on the Rules of the Sext is not
the essence. Important is not the formal source of a rule of law but its immediate appeal to
the legal mind and the moral heart. Principally their role lies in the need for legitimacy rather
than pure legality. It is that evident connection to formal and substantial justice through
which they may play such a significant part in political, administrative and judicial decisionmaking.
In a Habermasean framework the regulae may be seen as a first mode of resistance by the
lifeworld to a rules-driven jurisprudence. In regard to the various waves of juridification in
modern history Habermas himself mentions three distinct ways in which the lifeworld has
resisted a strict separation of law from morality (as argued by Weber27). A first response to
law as pure formality is embodied in the modern notion of the human being as an individual
with rights. This implies legal protection of individual interests against detrimental use of
power by others, including the sovereign (the state). Different subjective rights may well
clash, necessitating in concrete cases a weighing of the various interests involved in the light
of the normativity embodied in legal rules. Secondly, democratization of the political order
tends to confront persons holding office with reactions by those in whose private and public
interests power is supposed to be executed. Finally, in modern industrialized countries the
social welfare state guarantees freedoms and rights against the economic system.
These three modes of resistance to law as pure domination may well be conceived as bridges
between systems of functional formality and the lifeworld of (inter)personal normativity. In
this address the emphasis is particularly on the first bridge, taken in its normative setting of
human rights.
Human rights as laborious element in legal systems
From a legal-philosophical perspective human rights may be seen as connecting general
principles of justice with the conception of human beings as individuals with subjective
rights. Each distinct human right has a core that relates to human dignity. Behind that core is
a general principle connected with public justice in the sense of a communal conviction of
what is right and so crucial for the integrity of the public -political community that it ought to
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be enforced. Examples of such principles of justice as reflected in the International Bill of
Rights are liberty, equality, due process (with sub-principles such as habeas corpus and
objectivity and impartiality in judicial decision-making), humanity (respect for human life),
the integrity of the body, privacy, stability of possessions 28, participation29, etc. The next step in
terms of standard-setting is to elaborate these principles in legal texts aimed at incorporation in
different types of domestic law. The relative success of such attempts to further positivize
human rights depends firstly on the question whether in the country in question legal systems do
function, secondly on their judicial and political openness to the crucial issue of legitimacy as a
notion transcending pure formal legality, and thirdly on cultural factors. Indeed, spiritual roots of
a culture of human rights have to be found in different social and cultural contexts.30 Hence, in
accepting their responsibility for the implementation of human rights states are well advised to
look for religious and other types of moral support for efforts made within the environment of
their specific jurisdiction as well as in an international setting. This applies to the North as well
as the South. Particularly problematic in the American setting, for example, is the principle of
recognition of need – social justice – that lies behind articles 22 to 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. The struggle for social justice appeals to people’s sense of solidarity and collective
responsibility. But in the context of a settlers’ society like the USA – a country that has such
a dominant influence on global culture – it is individual autonomy rather than social justice
that dominates legal and political thinking. (‘Your well-being is not my concern. I made it,
now you have to make it!’). As we all know, this type of politico-legal thinking is not
confined to just the USA. Notably, the culture underlying economic globalization is generally
based on possessive individualism rather than social justice.
While the international community still lacks the means to enforce the fundamental freedoms
that have been declared as universal rights, basic entitlements for each and every human
being apparently cannot acquire a human rights profile by simple declaration. Yet, the
formulation of basic entitlements to education, health care, food, clothing, housing and
employment as rights has raised expectations and ‘rights-based approaches’ further increase
these. Thus, the world of human rights is a world of unfulfilled expectations. While,
inevitably, human rights have to be incorporated in the systems of our time, a serious concern
today is that they have become a typical system of their own: intergovernmental and
nongovernmental centres, compliance and complaints procedures with commissions,
committees and courts of law, training programmes and academic teaching courses, often quite
far removed from lifeworld perspectives. The term ‘secular religion’ is used in this connection,
and that is meant particularly in an institutional sense.
Is it advisable, then, to capitulate and abandon that whole venture for the protection of human
dignity through rights? My answer is no, because in the global struggle to bind all use of
power to essential standards we have nothing that could better suit the requirements of
protecting people’s human dignity in a modern setting. Rhetoric, true, but a strong and
morally compelling rhetoric. Rights do, indeed, fulfil the important function of providing
legal protection to subjective claims based on recognized interests, and hence incorporation
of human rights in functioning legal systems must be seen as essential, but even where this is
not yet the case they can still be seen as statements of what is right, an objective moral code,
in other words.
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At this point an aside is in place: the word ‘moral’ here concerns the grounding of these
rights in morality and does not imply that human rights should be considered as ‘moral
rights’ as opposed to ‘legal rights’. It is particularly in political science circles in North
America that we find that juxtaposition. The term ‘moral rights’ stands for rights that cannot
be enforced or, in other words, rights without remedies.31 But, one might ask, isn’t that the
essence of the human rights deficit: rights without remedies? Well, my answer to that would
be that remedies are never automatic; for one thing rights-holders always have to claim what
they are due. So the term ‘acquired rights’ should not be misinterpreted to mean rights with
automatic remedies. Rights are ‘performative’ (Austin) and one of the things that make
human rights distinct is that, perhaps more than other rights they are particularly
performative. The point made earlier is that in many respects the struggle for their
implementation is still in its early stages, and hence these rights often cannot offer
immediately effective remedies.
The word ‘right’, then, holds a legal significance, signifying that what is confirmed in such
terminology is right and ought to be protected by law so as to guarantee enforcement. Like
law itself, rights find their meaning in order and justice. As human rights are rooted in
justice, their realization is not just a matter of enforcing positive law but a moral issue.
Political economy of human rights
Let us now return to the strategic model on which the global human rights venture is based:
international standard-setting and monitoring coupled, principally, with local struggles for
enforcement and implementation. In this endeavour international agencies for development
cooperation such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have chosen to
concentrate their efforts on ‘enabling environments’ in the sense of enhancing the right type
of conditions under which people can exercise their human rights. It is abundantly clear,
however, that many people live in environments which, far from being conducive to local
implementation, must be regarded as hostile to any efforts for the protection of basic human
dignity. In such disabling conditions human rights tend to function not so much as legal
resources but as political instruments to mobilize dissent, protest, opposition and collective
action aimed at social and economic reform.
It is particularly in adverse conditions as those pertaining in situations of extreme pressure on
scarce resources that a political economy analysis may be enlightening. 32 It implies a metajuridical approach that looks beyond disciplinary boundaries. Empirically, the triangle economypolity-law is of central importance. Crucial is the analysis of economic, political and legal
aspects of problems and policies at their interface and in their interaction.
Political economy of human rights, then, is a way of looking behind systemic violations and
structural non-implementation. Remarkably, its contribution is not restricted to economic,
social and cultural rights. Lack of implementation of civil, political and cultural rights, too,
has to be assessed in a politico-economic context. Lederach has pointed, for example, to the
‘justice gap’ in efforts directed at peace-making. 33 Behind collective violence there often lies
a ‘root conflict’ (Galtung) related to economic aspects of public justice. Apparently, when the
violence ends, people expect not only pacification but also serious efforts towards economic
justice.34
Yet, the primary contribution of political economy of human rights lies in the field of
socioeconomic rights. The core focus is acquirement: why and how people succeed in
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acquiring what they need for sustainable livelihoods. The methodology I have proposed here
starts with Amartya Sen’s notion of entitlement failure, as advanced in his ‘Poverty and
Famines’.35 Indeed, behind failing claims to essential goods and services are deficient
entitlement positions, and behind entitlement failure are malfunctioning entitlement systems.
Of course, this address is not the right occasion to present a full introduction to entitlement
(sub)systems analysis. The Chair in Political Economy of Human Rights, as established in
the Law Faculty of this University, relates to both the Netherlands Research School on
Human Rights and the CERES Research School for Development Studies. In that
institutional setting I intend to further develop and elaborate this methodology into an
operational framework for the study of situations of structural non-implementation of
economic, social and cultural rights. I shall now restrict myself to just a brief explanation of
its essence. First a basic distinction has to be made between rights, entitlements and claims. A
right implies neither more nor less than an abstract acknowledgement of claims. Entitlement
is concrete: lawful command over a good or service in a specified use.36 A claim is an actual
act of acquirement. Let me give you an example: The owner of a house is generally
presumed free to use it. This includes the presumption of an entitlement to live there. Hence
he may well claim actual occupancy of those premises. But it is quite possible that another
person is already entitled to occupy that house, a tenant, for example. If both claim
occupancy at the same time the judge in question will look behind the conflicting claims and
weigh the relative strengths of the respective rights as well as the different interests of the
parties. If in the light of the rules and the facts the case seems to be unclear, general
principles may well provide the clarity that is needed to find the law in this specific dispute.
In regard to this type of case, for example, an old regula says ‘Nemo de domo sua extrahi
debet’; a modern principle is ‘Sale can break no rent’.
In the same way in which the relation between abstract rights and concrete entitlements is not
mechanical, neither is there an automatic link between entitlements and honoured claims
(actual acquirement). Usually, in order to claim what one wants certain activities are required
within processes of production, distribution and consumption of goods and services: land has
to be worked, commodities have to be manufactured and sold, services have to be delivered,
consumer goods have to be bought in shops, a door has to be opened with a key, etc.
Entitlements provide neither more nor less than access to such processes; actual acquirement
also requires activities and action.
Now, suppose a person is homeless simply because she lacks any concrete entitlement to
occupy any premises. What then, in terms of concrete entitlements, is the implication of her
housing right as defined in article 25 of the UDHR and article 11 of the ICESCR? Well,
unfortunately, this human right does not generally function as a direct source of concrete
entitlements. If, however, a homeless individual takes concrete action in order to find a roof
above her head, that housing right as recognized in international law, may well play its part.
In the Netherlands this is what actually happened in the nineteen-sixties and seventies when
squatters began occupying houses that stood empty as the owners used their property for
speculative purposes only. Another type of consequence that might follow from the general
housing right is a judicial prohibition to deprive human beings from access to their sole resort
without offering an alternative. In Indian public interest litigation, for instance, the Supreme
Court has ruled that homeless beggars cannot be simply removed from pavements of streets
on which they lay their heads. In short, while generally economic rights have been declared
as rights without entitlements, entitlements following from the human right in question can
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be asserted through concrete action. Human rights, in other words, are transformational, too:
they establish a normative framework for processes of social change.
As there can be rights without entitlements, the opposite may equally obtain. Thus, a peasant
may have lawful access to a plot simply because a relevant authority – e.g. the chief of his
tribe – granted this for as long as he works that piece of land. Indeed, institutional relations
may also serve as entitlement (sub)systems. Highly relevant in this connection is the
relationship between citizens and their state. Generally, state power may serve as a source of
many concrete entitlements. However, the state may also interfere negatively in people’s
entitlements, through expropriation for example. Hence, for the purpose of human rights
implementation government policies and actions have to be closely monitored in their effects
upon the entitlement positions of those living in daily hardship.
It is the universality of human rights as internationally accepted standards of legitimacy that
makes it possible to mobilize international support in struggles against their violation, too.
International pressure, through reporting or other types of procedures by the United Nations
Special Rapporteur for Housing for example, may well contribute to processes of acquiring
actual recognition of people’s housing needs. Indeed, it is often (international)
nongovernmental organizations rather than states that fight side-by-side with those carrying
out their responsibilities in UN compliance mechanisms.

Epilogue: Alternative approaches to law, power and morality
Notably, the possibility of taking human rights abuse to court tends to be underestimated,
particularly in regard to economic, social and cultural rights. Although, as has been pointed
out, a homeless individual cannot usually sue the state for provision of a house, forced
evictions or cutting off essential services can be contested in courts of law. There is a
difference, in other words, between a state of non-implementation and a concrete act of
violation. Now, if human rights were no more than subjective rights albeit of a special type,
the four major areas of impunity characterizing the human rights deficit mentioned at the
beginning of this presentation (impunity of state-related violators of basic human dignity, of
perpetrators of crimes within the four walls of the home, of oppressors of minorities, and of
those responsible for socioeconomic deprivation) would have a paralysing effect on the
whole venture. In that case the issue would be confined to justiciability. But the main point I
am making in this address is that precisely in situations in which the use of legal resources
becomes problematic, the function of human rights as standards of legitimacy is activated:
confrontation of abuse of power with norms based on protection of human dignity.
Government housing policies, to come back to our example, must be based on the right of
everyone to live in a decent house, and government budgets should reflect the priority given
to the satisfaction of people’s housing needs.
Human rights, then, must be seen not merely as subjective rights – to be enforced through
claims based on entitlements derived from them – but also as general principles of justice. In
the latter meaning they may play their part in adjudication too, not as a direct basis for the
acceptance of certain claims but to throw light upon a case, in the same way in which the old
regulae iuris perform that function. 37 Let us take, for example, the damages suffered by small
fishermen when, in the name of development, big trawlers are introduced that go into the
shallow waters, destroying the breeding grounds for the fish that forms the basis of their
livelihoods. It is true that in contentious action these people may fail to get recognition of
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claims based on a subjective ‘right to development’ but in concrete litigation procedures the
right to development may well be invoked in order to determine responsibility for a tort.38
Thus far, the emphasis has been on law in a modern universalistic sense, i.e. enforcement of
rules through regularized mechanisms. If, however, the realization of fundamental norms
binding the use of power were purely dependent on formal legal processes, in many places
deficits in the enforcement of crucial standards would be much worse. Fortunately, however,
law can also work through informal mechanisms or, in another terminology, as living law.39
While ‘law’ manifests itself as regulation of power, living law has the nature of ‘anti-power’.
An illustration may be taken from the social history of slavery in Barbados. Records of slave
births and sales show that from the end of the eighteenth century onwards infants were no
longer sold apart from their mothers and the nuclear family became a common phenomenon
among slaves, implying among other things that husbands and wives were also not sold
separately. 40 Apparently female slaves regarded motherhood as ‘a customary right’; yet there
was no justiciability whatsoever since slaves were regarded as chattel and certainly not
recognized as legal subjects. What we come across here is noticeable self-enforcement of
human rights by informal means.41
Moreover, as has been stated several times already, human rights function not only as legal
resources but as political instruments: standards of legitimacy, applicable to any use of
power, whether by the state or by non-state actors. The processes through which this is
effectuated may have a formal as well as an informal character. Besides living law, in other
words, we also touch upon living politics as a way of confronting power with human rights
standards. To illustrate the meaning of living politics it may be helpful to juxtapose two
distinct situations: a parliament without a free press means dead politics, a free press without
a parliament would lead to living politics. In the case of the fishermen described above, those
in power might feel aware of a potential resistance that is still submerged but would be likely
to get activated when the local population see their fishing grounds destroyed. Such a hidden
potential, based as it is on strong feelings of justice and injustice, might discourage big
trawlers from fishing in shallow waters. It is, indeed, in regard to non-state actors, too, that
living politics is likely to become increasingly relevant.42
Notably, globalization today also affects interpretations of legitimacy. As a consequence,
principles in regard to the use of power become more and more general in the sense of being
shared in the whole ius gentium. In regard to human rights this opens the way to more
inductive approaches. To clarify: a deductive approach derives concrete rights from
international treaties and other formal sources; an inductive approach starts from what people
see themselves as the fundamental freedoms and entitlements that everyone should enjoy.
Such a growing focus on lifeworld contexts also applies to processes of legitimization. Nonstate actors, too, face the consequences of this development.
The point is of course that notwithstanding their formal legal position all institutions today
exercise their power in a world in which there is growing consensus as to the unacceptability
of human rights abuse in general and in regard to interpretations of what precisely constitutes
such abuse in particular. Whereas it is true, for instance, that the churches in the Netherlands
do not fall within the realm of the General Equal Treatment Act43, they may be expected to
face increasing pressures from within Dutch society to observe the principle of nondiscrimination. Although general principles pertaining to legal entities stipulated in the Dutch
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Civil Code are formally not applicable to churches, to mention another example, in practice
analogous application of principles as bona fides by secular law courts has already been
accepted by the Supreme Court.44 The same applies to general principles of worker’s
protection that lie behind labour law, notwithstanding formal exemptions of churches from
such legislation. 45
In short, then, institutional decisions that affect the lives of people are more and more
confronted with universal standards of legitimacy, including the old regulae iuris and modern
human rights. While the international venture for the protection of human rights has been set
up with particular emphasis on the role of the state, today there is a growing attention to
human rights observance by non-state actors (Drittwirkung). Since historically the
applicability of rules of justice has never been confined to the state, such a development
should not surprise us. Moreover, in the major challenge of bridging functional systems and
lifeworld morality, states and non-state actors need each other.
It is time to conclude. Our concern has been with human rights as a global response to the
dialectics of power and justice as discussed almost two and a half millennia ago by
Thucydides. The project of protecting the basic human dignity of each and every human
being by declaring universal rights did not prove to be simple. Declared rights are rights, and
a rights-based organization of society demands functioning legal systems. This is already a
major challenge, as De Soto has shown in the key chapter on ‘The Mystery of Legal Failure’
in his recent book The Mystery of Capital.46 Declaring rights further implies that much more
is necessary than just protecting already acquired bundles of entitlements. Human rights law
is laborious law. In many a politico-economic context the transformation of these declared
rights into acquired rights with guaranteed freedoms and entitlements for everyone, requires
long and enduring struggles. As for civil and political rights it is the political order that has to
be confronted. In the case of economic, social and cultural rights it is the entitlement
(sub)systems that lie behind structural non-implementation which would have to be changed
and that means a confrontation with the economic powers that be.
Actually, the whole human rights venture faces three major threats from within. The first is a
simplification of human rights, with universality seen as just a matter of international law –
and with that an already settled issue. Although clear in a legal sense, in political and cultural
terms universality remains a major challenge, requiring continuous mobilization of support
from every possible quarter in the struggle to protect the dignity of all. Indeed, the global
human rights venture necessitates so much more than just the involvement of international
lawyers, however important their role may be. The second danger also lies in a
conceptualization of human rights as pure system, far removed from lifeworld realities. I am
referring here to legal instrumentalism: law as an instrument of social change. In fact the
assessment ‘rights with remedies’ is as simplistic as ‘rights without remedies’. The real tasks
we are facing today are no longer primarily in standard-setting but in the tribulations of
implementation. The third risk is in capitulation: the feeling that human rights law is of such
a laborious nature that we had better abandon the whole venture. What I have tried to show
today is, firstly, that laborious law is not impossible law as long as one refrains from
positivist dogmatism, while being prepared to look creatively for new ways of using human
rights as legal resources. In this connection I have sketched the role of human rights as not
just subjective rights in the conventional sense but general principles of justice which may
play their part in adjudication in a way similar to that of the old regulae iuris. In regard to
both economic, social and cultural rights and collective rights this opens new venues in
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litigation. Secondly, and related to that, I have pointed to the role of human rights as general
standards of legitimacy. As such they may function in alternative approaches to the dialectics
of power and morality such as living law and also as instruments in the politics of protecting
human dignity.
Human rights, then, is to be seen as a laborious, but not impossible, venture and from a
civilizational perspective a crucial challenge in our world today.
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